Radio Free Europe in 1956, as Hungarian Refugees Remembered
A key element of the “counterrevolutionary” propaganda of the Kádár era was that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 broke out at the instigation of the West, imperialist powers—especially US secret services—were actively involved in organizing the uprising, and it was Radio Free Europe (RFE) in Munich that relayed the instructions, both literally and figuratively.
This allegation was not proven then, or ever since. On the contrary, historical documents have made it clear for decades, that the Hungarian Revolution caught the West completely unprepared, and in fact shocked it. Yet, the role of the West in the revolution is once again subject of debates in Hungary.
CIA daily reports of the time, available in the Blinken OSA Archivum’s 1956 digital collection, show that the US intelligence community did not have the slightest idea of the impending outbreak of the revolution. Moreover, US strategic analyses did not expect people would overthrow the regime anywhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Allegedly, dictatorships and their security forces had such a hard and wide-scale grasp and control over these societies, that captive nations had no chance of shaking off the yoke of Communism. According to a report on Hungary in early 1956, while discontent was growing in the country, there was no chance of any mass movement or uprising to overthrow the regime.
The West was so surprised by what happened in October 1956 that, after the revolution had been crushed, the Americans and other Western countries conducted several extensive surveys among Hungarian refugees in order to find out how what everybody had believed was impossible became possible: in Hungary, a people’s revolt toppled the regime within days. See, for example, the Columbia University research project, or the UN Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, the documents of which are available on the Blinken OSA Archivum website.
The role of the West and RFE in 1956 has once again become debated recently, not independently of the Russian war against Ukraine and its pro-Russian portrayal by the propaganda machinery of the Hungarian government. The allegation, which is close sibling of the anti-Western accusations of the Kádár era, is the following: the West and the United States, through RFE, created false illusions about Western assistance, promised military intervention, then left the Hungarians to their fate. In other words, the West encouraged resistance in 1956 despite having been fully aware that they could not and would not intervene and provide military assistance.
On the one hand, this claim can be easily refuted. Today, anyone can listen online to RFE’s broadcasts from 1956, recordings have been made available on the websites of either the National Széchényi Library or the Blinken OSA Archivum since 2016.
After the defeat of the revolution, Hungarian broadcasts of RFE were subject to several investigations. The US and West German governmental investigations made a number of critical remarks about the tone and political orientation of the programs, but unanimously concluded that none of the broadcasts promised literally external intervention or armed assistance.
However, the problem is more complex than that, for Hungarian listeners did remember otherwise. The historical sources inform us that a great number, if not the majority, of Hungarian listeners later recalled that RFE had called for resistance and even promised military help. This also explains the disappointment, disillusionment, and bitterness of the Hungarian public after the defeat of the revolution, as well as the significant decline in listeners’ number and trust in RFE in the following years.
The propagandists of the Kádár regime were probably aware of this sentiment. The tale of the cynical and evil Western intervention did not only serve as justification for the “people’s republic’s” inability to cope with the counterrevolution on its own, and, consequently, for the Soviet intervention. Perhaps no one, not even the dumbest of state security officials, believed that. But another, unspoken, hidden message probably hit the target: you waited and hoped in vain for the West to come to your aid; they failed you. You can expect nothing from the West. It is very likely that this sentiment also contributed to why Hungarian society decided to give up passive resistance relatively quickly, resigning itself to the restoration of the regime, as the bitter May Day of 1957 clearly indicated it. To this day, the shadow of this disappointment and bitterness seems to linger. This may also be why today’s anti-Brussels and anti-Western propaganda can be so astonishingly effective among Hungarians.
Still, how is it possible that, in 1956, the people heard something that was not said? It is not so mysterious. The actual content and the presumed message of radio broadcasts, especially in the feverish, heightened atmosphere in which Hungarian society was caught up in the days of the revolution, could easily diverge. The Hungarian society cannot be blamed for having misheard the radio. Let us see why.
RFE was one of the most effective institutions of the Cold War strategy of the US, or more broadly, the West. Its mission was, in the words of Hungarian-American historian John Lukács, to cause “digestive problems” for a Soviet empire suddenly swelled up after the Second World War, by maintaining hope in liberation, freedom, and democracy. Its main task was to constantly erode the credibility and foundations of Communist regimes, to maintain a spirit of resistance in order to prevent Communist regimes from settling comfortably in Soviet-occupied countries. The existence of the radio and its broadcasts were thus closely linked to the doctrine of liberation, which was openly proclaimed as the long-term goal of US Cold War policy. RFE was integral to rolling back Soviet domination, and as such, its existence itself conveyed a promise of the West’s determination to do so.
Stalin’s death in March 1953 stirred the waters in the East and the West. In 1953, and even 1956, Stalinist dictatorships had only been in power for just a short time, less than a decade. No one knew exactly how the death of the tyrant would influence their stability. In Soviet satellite countries, Stalin’s passing revived people’s desire and hope for imminent and radical change, as it was manifested in the Berlin uprising in the summer of 1953, the local riots in Czechoslovakia in 1954–1955, the Poznan uprising in the summer of 1956 and its aftermath, and, in close connection to the latter, the Hungarian revolution in late October.
US foreign policy strategists also saw a chance that the uncertainty after the dictator’s death might have led to the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. This was amplified by the arrival of the Republican Eisenhower administration in early 1953. During the election campaign, Eisenhower promised a tougher stand against the Soviet threat than his Democratic predecessors. After he took office, the anti-Soviet rhetoric became more strident and heightened under the liberation doctrine, and this was reflected in the content and tone of RFE broadcasts as well.
And the radio’s listeners—perhaps naive and unversed in geopolitics—were not even the only ones to have thought so. After the revolution, György Heltai, the trained and polyglot diplomat and de facto minister of foreign affairs of the Imre Nagy governments, argued at length at his hearing before the UN Special Committee that the West had missed a historic opportunity by not using the Polish and Hungarian crises to contain the Soviets.
RFE broadcasts during the revolution may have also created false illusions for other reasons. First, by their relentless radicalism, attacking Imre Nagy until November 1, when he declared neutrality and the withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Of course, the collapse of the regime in Hungary, unlike in Poland, played a part in this. For this reason, the American advisers and the Hungarian editorial staff may have thought that there was a chance for a complete regime change, without having to reckon with the Communists.
The other, unrelated reason was that RFE’s correspondents were not allowed to enter Hungary. Thus, in the absence of programs with direct information and personal experience, the coverage of the widespread and unanimous international sympathy and support for the Hungarian cause seemed disproportionate. How could have Hungarian listeners see that the overwhelming majority of the world’s governments and public opinion in favor of the Hungarian revolution did not mean that the outside world was ready and able to offer concrete help against the Soviets? Finally, Hungarians were also bitterly disappointed to see that the Suez crisis ended with the deployment of UN peacekeepers, something Hungary waited in vain for.
After the revolution, some 200 thousand people are known to have emigrated. For RFE, interviews with refugees and emigrants have always been extremely valuable; refugees’ accounts were among the most important sources, as they were free of the contamination of the official propaganda. After 1956, one of the most frequent themes in these interviews was the role and impact of RFE. The interviews’ summaries, preserved at the Blinken OSA Archivum, reveal that a significant number of listeners were highly critical of the radio’s programs during the revolution, which they felt had raised false hopes, encouraged resistance, and promised international military assistance.
Rural radio programs, which continued for days after November 4, reporting on local resistance and fights following the Soviet invasion, prove the same. A recurring feature of these broadcasts was reaching out to RFE, begging for help and information: how much longer freedom fighters had to hold out, when would foreign troops arrive? It is quite obvious that those involved in the armed resistance did expect external military assistance, despite the fact that no one had ever promised it. These broadcasts were known in the West, as RFE prepared transcripts, which were even translated into English in 1957 for furthering the internal inquiry of the radio’s role.
Radio Free Europe had to respond to these accusations and criticisms. An internal investigation was also carried out, which found that while some broadcasts went beyond the general political directives, there was no mention of military assistance. The one broadcast suspected to have promised military intervention was not aired by RFE, but by NTS (the Free Russia Radio Station in Munich); according to the report, the Hungarian-language program featured András Zákó, the founder and commander of the Hungarian military organization in exile, the Hungarian Fighters’ Association, who addressed the still-fighting rebels with words of encouragement.
